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Our Newest Navy*
HOW ITS COST IS BEING DETERMINED

By David Potter
I
Several hundred vessels of our newest navy—vessels of types
from battle-cruiser to mine-sweeper and to torpedo-testing barge
—are being constructed at more than a score of civilian ship
yards. These vessels are being built, so far as concerns matters
of cost, upon a basis of their actual cost plus a profit on such
actual cost.
The administration of the matters of cost under these cost-plus
profit contracts has been entrusted by the secretary of the navy
to a group of officers called the compensation board. In accord
ance with a nomenclature first used by the bureau of supplies
and accounts, the name “cost inspection” has been given to the
work performed under the cognizance of the compensation board.
This cost inspection has already attracted the earnest attention
of shipbuilders, of producers of raw materials, of economists,
of financiers, of fiscal officials and of accountants.
Some reasons for this wide interest will be found in a brief
account of cost inspection set forth in this article. The cost
inspection herein referred to has no connection with any deter
mination of costs arrived at by the United States Shipping Board,
Emergency Fleet Corporation, for vessels being built by and for
that corporation—the navy is not charged with supervision over
the construction or the costs of construction of the vessels of the
Emergency Fleet Corporation.
Let him who ventures to read further take heart of grace!
Here he shall find no cryptic “graphs” or diagrams, no co-ordi
nates or abscissae marking cost-curves better left unplotted. He
shall find few arrays of figures, and none of them appalling.
Those phrases, melodious to certain ears—interest on investment,
deferred charges, shop cost, day rate, piecework, machine rate,
non-productive labor—shall ring not at all in these pages. There
will here be found almost none of the jargon of the schools of
accountancy.
*Copyrighted by United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland.
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II
I fancy that every explorer in a new land has a peculiar pride
in his discoveries in that land, quite aside from the charm he finds
in the contour of its landscape or in the sweep of its rivers. The
sense of something achieved that filled the soul of Columbus in
his discovery of America, of Cortez in his conquest of Mexico,
of da Gama in his rounding of the Cape of Good Hope, must
have been well-nigh divine. So, too, Newton’s understanding of
the significance of gravity, Watt’s realization of the potentiali
ties of steam, or Whitney’s invention of the cotton gin, was, in
its way, almost as soul-satisfying. Hardly less so, to the persons
concerned, were the conclusions of Taylor and Gantt in regard to
scientific management, and the exposition by Hamilton Church
of the advantages of the use of the capacity-factor in the pro
rating of indirect expense.
Boldly to compare, therefore, the explorations of the members
of the compensation board and of the officers of the bureaus with
the explorations of other men, perhaps there may be conceded
to the officers concerned the right to feel that something has been
achieved by their initiation of cost inspection in this country.
The secretary of the navy, by his order of March 22, 1917,
and supplementary orders issued from time to time, organized
the compensation board—made up of representatives of the line,
the construction corps, the civil engineer corps and the pay corps.
The department directed the board, first, to ascertain, estimate,
and determine, in accordance with the terms of contracts, the
actual costs of vessels building or about to be built under con
tract, with the navy department, on a “cost-plus-profit” basis;
second, to decide upon, control, and supervise the execution of all
methods necessary to be established to carry out its duties,
especially those defined in the contracts for vessels building or
to be built upon the “cost-plus-profit” basis.
The compensation board at once requested the bureau of
supplies and accounts to call upon officers of the pay corps ex
perienced in accounting to make recommendations as to methods
of cost inspection. These recommendations were promptly sub
mitted. After consideration of the various plans proposed, the
compensation board formulated general instructions under which
cost inspection has since proceeded.
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In addition to the indispensable aid of the officers of the regular
pay corps, the compensation board has received the self-sacri
ficing assistance of a group of professional accountants and
financiers—able and accomplished officers commissioned in the
pay corps naval reserve force and assigned to duty with the
compensation board. Officers of the bureaus of steam engineer
ing, construction and repair, yards and docks and supplies and
accounts, as well as the jurists of the office of the solicitor for the
navy department, have also furnished invaluable help.
III
Prior to March 22, 1917, vessels built for the navy at civilian
shipyards were built on a fixed-price basis. A torpedo-boat
destroyer, exclusive of armor and armament, used to cost the
navy from $550,000 to $900,000. A battleship of the first class
cost the navy from $4,400,000 to $7,500,000. These prices, of
course, represented expenditures made by the shipbuilder for
direct labor and for direct material, plus indirect expense, plus
his profit. What amount of a shipbuilder’s fixed-price to the
navy was profit was not known to the navy, although close esti
mates were made by the navy’s representatives. It is not un
reasonable to say that even if the shipbuilder knew pretty closely
what expenditures he had made for direct labor and for direct
material, he did not know how much of his selling price was
overhead and how much was profit. The price the shipbuilder
fixed to the navy was, at best, only an estimate, the estimate based
on “experience” or “judgment,” which, being interpreted, too
often signified only a guess.
The increasing cost of raw materials and the increasing cost
due to high wages paid to employees resulted in the prices named
by the shipbuilders to the navy reaching a very high figure. In
dications of the inevitable result of these increased prices asked
by the shipbuilders from the navy were given again and again
by the navy department. These indications were given not only
in the form of tenders renewed and rejected, but, specifically, in
the form of requests from the navy department to shipbuilders
that lower prices should be offered, if possible.
But induced by what they believed to be economic necessity,
and inspired by motives of self-protection, the shipbuilders who
were accustomed to construct naval vessels continued to make
tenders only of prices unacceptable to the navy department. The
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navy department became convinced that the prices demanded by
the shipbuilders were unnecessarily high—that the percentages to
cover contingencies were greater than the contingencies would
actually require.
It is certain that it was the duty of the navy department, while
affording shipbuilders opportunity to earn a reasonable profit, at
the same time to protect the interests of the government to the
fullest extent of its powers. This duty it has performed to the
utmost.
By the act of August 29, 1917, under the heading “Increase
of the navy,” it was provided,
That if, in the judgment of the secretary of the navy, the most rapid
and economical construction of the battle cruisers authorized herein can
be obtained thereby, he may contract for the construction of any or all of
them upon the basis of actual cost, plus a reasonable profit to be deter
mined by him.

As brief as the above quoted lines are, they mark the granting
of a power to the government which was to result in revolution
izing the financial and accounting features of the construction of
naval vessels at civilian shipyards. It is possible, even, that a
revolution was begun in the whole economic situation of the ship
building industry. The above-quoted provisions of law were
supplemented by certain vital provisions in the act of March 4,
1917, the act of October 6, 1917, and the act of July 1, 1918. It
is the appropriate provisions of the respective naval appropria
tion bills which made possible the construction of naval vessels
at private shipyards on the basis of actual cost plus an agreedupon amount of profit.
IV
During the autumn and winter of 1916 and the winter and
spring of 1917, the navy department and its duly authorized
representatives were engaged in endeavoring to persuade what
may be called the “old-line” shipbuilders to agree to construct
naval vessels at an acceptable fixed-price. Failing this, the navy
department endeavored to agree with the shipbuilders upon a
proper cost-plus-profit basis upon which to proceed with the work
of construction.
For several years, a considerable amount of ordinary building
erection has been done in America on a cost-plus-profit basis. It
is evident, however, to anyone who has knowledge of shipyard
work that ordinary building-erection on a cost-plus-profit basis
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is a very different thing from the construction of vessels on the
same basis. Without entering into details, it is believed that this
will be conceded.
Since the beginning of the European war, in 1914, and in a few
sporadic instances before that time, certain civilian steamship
companies had had vessels constructed at civilian shipyards on
a so-called cost-plus-profit basis. The word “so-called” is used
advisedly, since checking of such costs, either by the shipbuilder
or the steamship company, was little more than nominal. The
steamship companies had no, or at least very inadequate, ma
chinery for verifying the records of cost presented by the ship
builders. Further, except for approximately correct records of
direct labor and direct material charges, the records of cost of
the shipbuilder, as presented to the steamship company for
payment, were little better than estimates. In fact, such records
had all the joyous freedom from restraint of an ordinary fixedprice contract.
In a word, almost no precedent existed in America for the
determination of costs of vessels being constructed on a cost
plus-profit basis.
It may be noted, in passing, that since the beginning of the
European war, a vast amount of naval construction has been done
in Great Britain on a cost-plus-profit basis. It is interesting to
note, further, that such method of construction in Great Britain,
on the whole, is not regarded by the British authorities as a suc
cess, so far as keeping down costs is concerned. Examination
of British records in the case indicates, however, that this feeling
of failure is not so much due to the fact that costs have been
excessive—if, indeed, they have been—but is due to the diffi
culties encountered by the British authorities in satisfactorily
checking the records of costs. Upon perusal of the British hear
ings, it is not certain, as a matter of fact, that costs have not
been satisfactorily checked; but the feeling of dissatisfaction
seems rather to have arisen from the difficulty found by govern
ment representatives in making clear to the committees of parlia
ment that costs have been adequately checked.
V
For the purposes of the present consideration, there are four
practicable divisions of contracts. The differences between the
four kinds are sufficiently well defined in the report of a sub-

340

Our Newest Navy: Its Cost

committee of the interdepartmental cost conference. This con
ference was composed of representatives of the departments
of commerce, of war, of navy, of the federal trade commission,
the council of national defense, and the war industries board. A
sub-committee of the interdepartmental cost conference drew up
a report known as “Remarks on contracts” (July 31, 1917). As
this is a clear exposition of the advantages and disadvantages of
the four different kinds of contracts, some part of the remarks
is quoted.
A. The Fixed Sum Contract
By this is meant the form of contract in which the contractor, generally
in competition with other contractors, bids a fixed lump sum for the fur
nishing of supplies or the performance of services (other than personal)
under conditions laid down by the government.
********
To summarize then—this form of contract has the advantage of sim
plicity but has the disadvantages of establishing a diversity instead of a
community of interest between the government and the contractor, of
demoralizing the supply and prices of raw materials, and of requiring
increased time to secure competition.
********

B. The Cost Plus a Percentage Contract
This form of contract involves the complication and expense of requir
ing that the government itself determine, or at least check with consider
able accuracy, the actual costs to the contractor.
It enforces upon the government the necessity of supervising the con
tractual relations between its main contractor and his sub-contractors,
for it is to the advantage of the main contractor to make his sub-contracts
cost as much as possible.
It offers every inducement for the contractor to inflate his costs, and
there are an almost infinite number of ways of doing this; the temptation
for the contractor is to inflate both his actual costs in every respect, and
the cost he reports to the government.
Assuming that the above objections can be met, it has the advantage
of protecting the government from excessive prices without demoralizing
the prices and supply of raw materials, and of saving time.
********
To summarize—this form of contract has the advantages of saving time
and preventing demoralization of markets, but has the disadvantages of
establishing a diversity instead of a community of interest between the gov
ernment and the contractor, of involving the government in the expense
and trouble of determining or checking contractor’s costs, of supervising
his relations with sub-contractors and of giving rise to contentions between
the government and the contractor that may be very troublesome during
the contract and for many years thereafter.
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C. The Cost Plus a Lump Sum Contract
In this form of contract the actual cost to the contractor, determined
or checked by the government is paid to the contractor, plus a definite
lump sum, which, in the judgment of the contracting officer, is a reason
able reimbursement to the contractor for the employment of his services,
plant, and organization in producing the desired product for the gov
ernment.
********
Once this lump sum has been determined and accepted by the con
tractor, the contractor is under no inducement to inflate his actual costs,
though he may still be tempted to inflate his reported costs to the govern
ment His costs must therefore be determined or checked by the govern
ment as in “B,” above. Neither is he under any inducement to keep his
costs low—in short, in so far as the real costs are concerned, he occupies
a neutral position.
********
To summarize—this form of contract has the advantages of saving time
and preventing demoralization of markets. It establishes neither a diver
sity nor a community of interests between the government and the con
tractor. It involves the government in the expense and complication of
determining or checking the contractor’s costs, and may involve some
supervision of sub-contractual relations, although not so much as in “B.”
. . . . Assuming that the difficulties in determining the contractor’s
costs can be met, it appears to be a satisfactory form of contract.
********

D. The Cost Plus a Lump Sum with Limited Penalty and Bonus
Contract
In this form of contract a preliminary estimate is made by the con
tracting officer as in “C,” or by the contracting officer and contractor in
agreement. A lump sum consideration is fixed by the contracting officer
as in “C,” on the basis of the estimated cost. The contractor is informed
of or agrees to the estimated cost and the lump sum consideration. If
the actual cost after the work is done is just equal to the estimated cost,
the lump sum consideration is paid, exactly as in “C.” However, if the
contractor is able to reduce the actual cost below the estimate, any reduc
tion is shared half and half between the government and the contractor,
provided that the contractor shall not receive more than a certain maxi
mum. On the other hand, if the actual cost exceeds the estimate, half
the excess is carried by the government and the other half is deducted
from the lump sum compensation that was the basis; provided again, that
the contractor’s profit shall not be reduced below a certain minimum.
********
In this form of contract the contractor is again put practically on a
salary and rental basis, but with a penalty and bonus provision that brings
about a community of interest between him and the government, so safe
guarded that unduly excessive profits to the contractor are prevented and
also so as to ensure that he neither loses money on account of his work
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for the government nor finishes without any compensation whatsoever.
The contractor has every reason to reduce his actual costs, and so far
a community of interest has been established. On the other hand, he has
the temptation of inflating his reported costs to the government. It will
therefore still be necessary for the government to check or determine
costs, as in both “B” and “C.”

To summarize—this form of contract saves time and prevents de
moralization of markets. It establishes a community of interests between
government and contractor. It involves the government in the expense
and trouble of determining or checking contractor’s costs, but involves
no supervision of sub-contractual relations, since the contractor’s interests
and the government’s are identical so far as keeping down costs of sub
contracts are concerned. Assuming that the difficulties in determining con
tractor’s costs can be met, it appears to be a satisfactory form of contract.
*

*******

The first group of contracts for the construction of our newest
navy, as entered into by the navy department, is the cost-plusten-per-cent.-profit style of contract. In view of the fact that, as
has just been indicated, this contract has been regarded as perhaps
the least desirable of the three kinds of cost-plus contracts, from
the government point of view, it may be asked why the navy
department entered into a cost-plus-ten-per-cent.-profit contract
in preference to a fixed-profit-on-a-sliding-scale contract. The
answer to such a question is complete and two-fold: first, the
cost-plus-ten-per-cent.-profit contracts were formally entered into
in April, 1917, and actually were agreed upon by the middle of
February, 1917, before as much was known of the relative advan
tages and disadvantages of the different kinds of practicable con
tracts as is now known. Second—perhaps the more important
reason of the two—the policy of the navy department at that time
made the cost-plus-ten-per-cent.-profit contract preferable to all
others—in fact, made its adoption inevitable.

VI
Governance is one of the most difficult and delicate arts in the
world. In its last analysis, the tools and instruments of adminis
tration are persons—hence, machine action can never be counted
upon from them. In all important situations, the psychology of
human beings must be considered. Governance can, therefore,
never be a science, but must ever remain an art. It is hoped
that the expression of these facts here will riot be found plati343
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tudinous in considering the reasons for the adoption of the types
of contracts entered into by the navy department with the ship
builders.
For many years past, the orders placed by the navy depart
ment with the principal civilian shipyards for the construction of
naval vessels had furnished the very backbone of the “old-line”
shipyards’ business. Such orders enabled the shipbuilders to
stabilize their laboring force, to assure sub-contractors of a re
liable market for fabricated articles entering into naval vessels,
and to constitute a steady demand for the producers of raw ma
terials. Such orders have been a financial guarantee to the stock
holders of the respective shipbuilding companies, since they rep
resented work upon whose completion no such thing as a bad debt
existed out of all of the millions involved, because the debtor was
the United States government itself. It will thus be seen that
the shipbuilders owed a particular responsibility to the navy
department and, in fact, owed a very great and very particular
debt of gratitude to the navy department because the department
had enabled the shipbuilders to carry on their business in good
times and bad times alike.
On the other hand, the maintenance of an efficient shipbuilding
industry was of primary importance to the navy department, and
to the nation. Commerce, industry, and agriculture itself, are
alike dependent, directly or indirectly, upon the ships that sail
the seas. While our interoceanic commerce-bearers are usually
spoken of as negligible in quantity, they are so only relatively to
the seagoing vessels of certain other nations and relatively to
the vast quantity of goods transported overseas from this coun
try. Actually, the interoceanic tonnage of this country is very
great. More important is the fact that our coastwise trade is,
by law, carried on in our own bottoms and that these bottoms
are, by law, made in America. For the construction of these
vessels, a sound shipbuilding industry is essential. It is vital,
therefore, that the government, which is only the people itself,
should take the necessary measures to sustain, at all times, an
adequate shipbuilding industry. As part of this industry, it is
necessary that men-of-war should be built sufficient in number
and size and quality to sustain and protect the national policies
in all parts of the world.
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In harmony with these ideas, it is vital for the navy depart
ment to make sure that the price at which naval vessels are built
for it by civilian shipbuilders should represent not less than the
actual cost, not less than a reasonable profit. While the navy
department uses records of costs secured in the course of the
construction of men-of-war at navy yards to check up and to cor
rect the claims of civilian shipbuilders, yet, at the same time, it
uses the navy cost-records to justify its allowance to civilian
shipbuilders of such price as may be agreed upon. In the case
of the policy of the cost-plus-profit contracts now before us, the
navy department believed it to be necessary—particularly in view
of the national and international emergency then existing—to
make such arrangements with the shipbuilders as fully to pro
tect the government and not less fully to protect the interests of
the shipbuilders. Even more, it seemed necessary to err, if at all,
on the side of liberality to the shipbuilders, in order that the work
might proceed with the utmost possible dispatch and with the
utmost cordiality of feeling.
VII
Having in mind the above outlined considerations as to the
protection of the government’s interests, and, per contra, the con
siderations as to the protection of the shipbuilders’ interests, the
navy department, so far as concerns the construction of new
vessels, entered into contracts on a basis of cost-plus-ten-per-cent.profit. These contracts are of a sort that any disinterested person
must concede to be not illiberal toward the shipbuilders. The
terms of these contracts allow as actual costs various items which,
under ordinary circumstances, are considered only as proper
charges against a profit and loss account, and, hence, not reim
bursable to the shipbuilder or manufacturer. Some of such items
are interest, rent, selling expenses, and taxes of all kinds, except
ing those imposed by the United States government. By the
terms of the contracts, the cost of these items, plus ten per cent.
thereof, must be allowed as part of the compensation to the ship
builders.
It must be understood that the cost-plus-ten-per-cent. contract
was entered into only after very extended discussion between
the navy department and the “old-line” shipbuilders, and between
both of these groups and the proper committees of congress. If
anyone should care to investigate the matter, he would find in-
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numerable pages of discussion published in the hearings of the
committee on naval appropriations, house of representatives, of
the session of 1915-1917. He would there find that the ship
builders proposed that a contract be entered into on the basis of
the actual-costs-plus-sixty-five-per-cent. of the direct labor—this
sixty-five per cent. to cover overhead and profit. So evident is
it that the adoption of this method would have immensely sim
plified the tasks of the government in checking costs—since much
of the contentious question as to what is or what is not over
head would have been removed—that one may well wonder why
this arrangement was not at once agreed to by the department.
There were various reasons of policy, as already referred to,
but, in addition, there was the fact that the shipbuilders, for the
most part, were unable to make clear to the navy department
how much of the sixty-five per cent. was profit.
The above circumstance is not so remarkable as one who has
not had actual experience with the accounts of even the largest
corporation might imagine: I think it is not too much to say that
it is only the unusual company which has an accounting system
satisfactory to anyone but itself, or which can clearly show to
outsiders or even to its own officials what are or what are not the
actual costs of its own product. The hearings above referred
to would make clear to anyone who should read them that the
navy department and the shipbuilders’ discussions were at cross
purposes, or, at least, that their points of view could not, at that
time, be made to harmonize as expressed in the terms of any
other form of contract than the one finally adopted: viz., contracts
upon a basis of actual cost plus ten per cent. profit thereon.
It is worth while noting that the cost-plus-ten-per-cent.-profit
form of contract soon gave way to the cost-plus-fixed-profit form.
As a matter of fact, only a relatively few of the total number of
vessels have been constructed under the all-inclusive cost-plusten-per-cent.-form—by far the larger number now being built
under the superior cost-plus-fixed-profit form. Of this, more
hereafter.
VIII
Examination of the terms of a contract for the construction of
ships on a basis of cost-plus-profit will show that the compensa
tion board, as representatives of the navy department, is charged
with four distinct sets of duties. The first duty is that the com346
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pensation board shall control the method of checking costs and
shall ascertain the correctness of such costs. The second duty
is that it shall satisfy itself that the prices charged by the ship
builders for material are the lowest possible market prices ob
tainable, having in view the necessity for speedy delivery and
the necessity for the delivery of material of the proper quality
and quantity. The third duty is to determine what additional
facilities a shipbuilder must have to carry out naval contracts and
to allow the expenditures necessary to construct such facilities
or a part of them. The fourth duty is to appraise the value of
such facilities after the completion of the contracts.
It will be evident that when scores of naval vessels are being
constructed with the utmost possible dispatch and when expendi
tures will eventually run considerably over $1,000,000,000, the
compensation board, having its headquarters in Washington, can
itself do no more than supervise and decide upon the actions
necessary to keep account of costs. The task might have seemed
almost insuperable except that the navy had already within its
organization various agencies which could at once be employed
upon matters of cost inspection.
Line officers of the navy skilled in steam-engineering have
often been pioneers in all matters connected with marine engines
and propelling machinery for vessels. The constructors of the
navy are not approached by any part of the civilian world in their
knowledge of ship design and of the actual construction of ships.
The civil engineer officers of the navy stand, in regard to all
phases of civil engineering, in the same position as do the naval
constructors in regard to ship construction and the navy engineers
in regard to propelling machinery. The fourth group of officers
in the navy possesses a kind of knowledge even more necessary
for the proper conduct of cost inspection. Indeed, without such
knowledge, cost inspection could not be conducted. This know
ledge is that of the officers of the pay corps of the navy in regard
to prices of material, handling of material, and cost accounting.
Thus already equipped with superintending constructors, with
inspectors of machinery, with civil engineers, and with cost in
spectors, the compensation board was ready to proceed with the
establishment of a proper procedure for cost inspection. At each
of the shipyards concerned, the officers above referred to were
formed into a cost inspection board. The respective cost inspec347
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tion boards are the instruments through which the compensation
board works—the compensation board has no direct communica
tion with the respective shipbuilders, except as such shipbuilders
may personally present themselves in the office of the compen
sation board for information.
At the respective shipyards, the supervising civil engineer is
not a member of the cost inspection board, but is a member of a
subsidiary board, known as the plant board. Each plant board
is made up of a supervising civil engineer and of the resident
cost inspector, this plant board being responsible directly to the
local cost inspection board, and thence to the compensation board.
It is to be observed that the superintending constructor is
responsible for matters relating to fabrication of hulls of vessels;
that the inspector of machinery is responsible for matters relating
to the machinery of vessels; that the civil engineer (as a member
of the plant board) is responsible for matters relating to con
struction of buildings, building ways, etc., and that the cost in
spector is responsible for matters relating to the actual inspection
of costs and to the proper records and reports appertaining
thereto. Each of these officers is responsible for his own group
of work, but each accepts the information acquired by the others
as being as authentic as his own. They meet together for final
settlement by themselves, sitting as a cost inspection board, of
such matters as can be agreed upon, or for making final recom
mendation from themselves, as a cost inspection board, to the
compensation board at Washington, which latter board is the
final board of decision.
Observe, also, that each of the members of the cost inspection
board has a competent office force. The persons attached to the
offices of the superintending constructor and inspector of ma
chinery are skilled draftsmen, and similar persons, suitable for
design and inspection of hull material, or of machinery material,
as the case may be. Of particular interest is the constitution of
the cost inspector’s office. His officer-personnel includes several
assistants who have lately been certified public accountants or
have had similar experience, and also includes the usual clerks
who have had experience in the accounting offices at the navy
yards. The force also includes “outside men,” competent to in
vestigate, on the spot, such matters as require correction in rela348
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tion to the number of laborers that may be employed on a given
job, or in relation to the methods of handling material intended
for use in government work.
The compensation board has necessarily worked through its
agents, the cost inspection boards. The performance of duty of
these officers has been beyond praise. To their resourcefulness,
persuasiveness, and pertinacity, to their resolution and intelli
gence, the success of cost inspection is largely due. The success
of cost-plus-profit contracts depends upon the efficacy of inspec
tion of costs. In the rigorous and thorough-going character of
its cost-inspection the navy has been notably fortunate.
IX
It is worth while emphasizing here that the only kind of
cost-plus contract under the cognizance of the compensation board
is the cost-plus contract for the construction of new naval vessels.
This kind of contract is under the cognizance of the compensa
tion board, but the organization of the cost inspector’s office, the
details of the accounts kept, and all similar matters, are handled
by the bureau of supplies and accounts. The officers of the
pay corps concerned have, also, the same responsibility to their
bureau in regard to the technique of their profession as the super
intending constructor and inspector of machinery have to their
respective bureaus.
Cost inspection under contracts for repairs to naval vessels,
for repairs to vessels seized from the enemy, for repairs to
merchant vessels taken over as naval auxiliaries, for the manu
facture of ordnance material, for the manufacture of aeroplane
parts, for the manufacture of machinery, or for any other repair
or manufacturing purposes, is not under the compensation board.
Cost inspection under contracts for repairs or manufacture—as
distinguished from contracts for the construction of new naval
vessels—is under the cognizance of the bureau of supplies and
accounts and the bureau of construction and repair, the bureau
of supplies and accounts and the bureau of steam engineering,
and the bureau of supplies and accounts and the bureau of ord
nance, as the case may be.
So far as the observance of correct accounting principles is
concerned, and so far as ease and simplicity in their operation go,
the form of the contracts for manufacturing work is greatly to
be preferred to the form of contracts for the construction of new
349
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vessels. The cost-inspection of manufacturing contracts has
been carried on with the same success as has attended the cost
inspection for the construction of new vessels. Since, however,
manufacturing contracts are not under the cognizance of the
compensation board, the details need not be dwelt upon here.
It should be borne in mind, however, that the bureau of supplies
and accounts is conducting cost inspection at several hundred
manufacturing plants and that such work is distinct from the
work of the compensation board.
X
The instructions of the compensation board to the various
cost inspection boards, as approved by the secretary of the navy,
do not prescribe a standard system of cost-accounting, nor do
they authorize, strictly speaking, the keeping of a cost-accounting
system by the cost-inspector. The terms of the contract provide
“that no changes in the methods or principles of keeping account
of costs shall be required, provided the department finds such
principles and methods adequate for the determination of actual
costs.” Unless, therefore, there are found, from time to time,
charges against the government account that prevent a true record
of costs being kept, no change is made.
This acceptance by the government of the shipbuilders’
methods and principles of keeping account of costs was necessary,
in the first place, because the upsetting of the shipbuilders’ cost
accounting system would have made very grave financial and in
dustrial confusion in the shipbuilders’ works, and, in the second
place, because of the fact that the government did not have at
hand a standard cost-accounting system entirely applicable to
civilian shipyards. The standard navy-yard cost-accounting
system is complete and works efficiently—it is complete but not
entirely satisfactory to the officers of the pay corps of the navy,
because of the fact that the peculiarities arising out of the gov
ernment’s system of appropriations prevent a thoroughly satis
factory navy-yard cost-accounting system’s being established. As
a consequence, since, up to the date of the establishment of cost
inspection, the navy had not been concerned, except indirectly,
with the cost-accounting systems at private shipyards, a standard
system was not at hand that could be established at private ship
yards without delay. However, the decisive consideration in this
matter was the one first named, viz., that to establish a new cost-
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accounting system in the shipbuilders’ yards was to produce, for
a vital period, very grave financial and industrial confusion in
the shipbuilders’ plants.
On the other hand, the experience gained by the officers of the
pay corps of the navy from their handling of navy-yard cost
accounting systems had thoroughly equipped them for the under
standing of cost-accounting in general. Hence, while the cost
accounting systems at the different civilian shipyards are almost
as numerous as the shipyards themselves, and while some of
them cannot be said to be satisfactory even to themselves—yet
none of these systems has presented any mystery to the under
standing of the cost inspection board concerned.
The compensation board, under the instructions of the navy
department, therefore, authorized the cost inspection boards at
the civilian plants to carry out what it denominated as a selective
and corrective check of the contractor’s records of costs and of
the actual physical transactions he carries on. In other words,
the government expressly avoids duplicating the shipbuilder’s
cost-accounting records. What it does is to have full access to
all the cost records, as well as to the physical operations, of the
shipbuilder, and to check up by an extensive system of selected
matters the correctness of his whole procedure, and to correct by
this selective check such inadvertences in the shipbuilder’s records
or methods of procedure as may be discovered.
XI
In order to expedite the construction of naval vessels, it was
necessary that practically all the shipyards concerned should
greatly increase their plants—both buildings and equipment. At
once, the shipbuilders pleaded financial inability, or, at least, finan
cial difficulty in furnishing such plant extensions at their own
expense. So far as such are concerned, the navy department
has, therefore, entered into various interesting arrangements.
If the plant extension or equipment desired by the government
is of a sort likely to be necessary for the shipbuilder’s use in the
ordinary conduct of his business in ordinary times, then the navy
department pays the shipbuilder, as fast as he makes the ex
penditure, not to exceed fifty per cent. of the cost. This class of
allowances is known as special rentals “A.”
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Five important points are to be noted in this special rentals
“A” class. First, no depreciation on this class is allowed the
shipbuilder, the special rentals rate being in lieu of all deprecia
tion. Second, owing to the requirements of the laws governing
government appropriations, the value of such special rentals is
recorded as a part of the cost of the vessels; for example: if the
shipbuilder builds an extension to his foundry at $100,000, the
government may decide that only twenty per cent. of that amount
is due to the government’s specific requirements; hence, the ship
builder must pay $80,000 from his own funds and the govern
ment will pay him $20,000 in addition, thus making up the
$100,000. Therefore, if there are twenty vessels of equal value
building at the shipyard, the cost of each vessel will be increased
by $1,000. Third, at the expiration of the contract, the govern
ment reconsiders its rate of allowance, and, if equity demand,
pays the shipbuilder more or less of the special rentals value, or
“stands pat” in the matter. Fourth, the title to this sort of
plant extension becomes vested in the shipbuilder, and not in the
government. The fifth point to be noted under the head of
special rentals “A” is that no profit is allowed the shipbuilder
upon expenditures made under this head.
If the plant extension or equipment desired by the government
is of a sort not likely to be necessary for the shipbuilder’s use in
ordinary times, then the navy department pays the shipbuilder,
as fast as he makes the expenditure, the full amount of such
expenditures. This class of allowances is known as special
rentals “B.”
Four points are to be noted in regard to special rentals “B”;
First, no depreciation is allowed. Second, the value of such
rentals is carried in toto into the costs of the vessels concerned.
Third, at the expiration of the contract, the government takes
title to the property, but the government gives the shipbuilder the
option of acquiring title to the property at an agreed-upon price.
If the shipbuilder does not offer a price satisfactory to the
government, the property remains the property of the government.
Fourth, no profit is allowed the shipbuilder upon expenditures
under special rentals “B.”
Under the act of October 6, 1917, additional plant facilities
were authorized. These are of the general nature of special
rentals “B,” i. e., their full value is payable by the government
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to the shipbuilder. However, two important differences are to
be noted. First, in no circumstances is the value of such plant
facilities charged as part of vessels. Second, the title to property
of this nature vests in the government.
Recapitulating, then, this part of the navy department’s
arrangements to finance the shipbuilder, we find that plant exten
sions are financed thus: First—special rentals “A”—a fifty per
cent. allowance, or less, to the shipbuilder, of the value of the
property, the title to the property vesting forthwith in the ship
builder; second—special rentals “B”—a one hundred per cent.
allowance to the shipbuilder, the title to the property vesting in
the government, but the shipbuilder having the option of pur
chase from the government; third—plant facilities under act of
October 6, 1917—a one hundred per cent. allowance to the
shipbuilder, but the title to the property vesting definitely in the
government.
XII
Bills covering reimbursement by the government to the ship
builder for expenditures made by him for material, labor, indirect
expense, and to cover his profit, are made monthly. Such bills
are made up at the shipyard, certified to by the local cost inspec
tion board, then forwarded to the compensation board at Wash
ington for review. The board, if satisfied with the bills, then
recommends to the secretary of the navy that they be paid. After
receiving the signature of the secretary of the navy and of the
chiefs of the bureaus of steam engineering and construction and
repair, they are sent for payment to the disbursing officer of the
cost inspection board concerned.
It is evident that if payment were made to the shipbuilder only
on his monthly bills, he would always have large amounts of
money due him from the government, and, hence, would have his
available supply of liquid capital much “tied-up” at any given
time. To obviate this difficulty—to pay the shipbuilder with the
utmost promptness—preliminary payments are authorized to be
made on the spot. The shipbuilder can present a material invoice
or a labor roll to the local cost inspector, certify that he has actu
ally made the expenditures, and receive reimbursement forthwith
from the disbursing officer detailed by the bureau of supplies and
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accounts for duty with the local cost inspection board. The ship
builder is actually paid large sums almost every day within four
or five hours after he presents his bill, if he so desires.
The next step authorized by the navy department to finance
the shipbuilder was to make reimbursements to him for progress
payments made by the shipbuilder to a sub-contractor. Warrant
of law for the making of partial payments had been granted by
the act of March 4, 1911, but such warrant had not been utilized
to its full extent. Under the cost-plus contracts, however, this
law has come to a wide range of usefulness. For example: five
boilers are ordered by shipbuilder, A, from sub-contractor, B.
When one boiler is finished but not yet delivered, a navy repre
sentatives certifies to the local cost inspection board that the boiler
appears to be satisfactory. Payment is thereupon immediately
made by A to B for the one boiler, even although it may remain
undelivered indefinitely, and reimbursement in the proper sum is
made by the navy to A.
The next method of assisting in financing the shipbuilder was
authorized by a recent act of congress—urgent deficiency act of
October 6, 1917. Under the power of this law, the navy depart
ment has authority to advance to contractors any amounts up to
thirty per cent. of the value of the contract. Thus, if the ship
builder makes a contract with a boiler manufacturer in a total
amount of $90,000, the shipbuilder can advance to the boiler
manufacturer the sum of $27,000, and the navy department will
immediately reimburse the shipbuilder the $27,000. However,
in order that this privilege may not be abused, the prior authority
of the department is necessary for each specific sub-contractor.
Also, the sub-contractor is usually required to furnish sufficient
security.
Finally, under the act of October 6, 1917, already referred to,
the department has authority to make advances to the amount of
thirty per cent. of the value of the contracts made with the ship
builders. Thus, if a shipbuilder had a contract for building one
hundred ships at $1,000,000 apiece, or $100,000,000, the depart
ment could advance $30,000,000 on such ships. In no case, how
ever, although it has advanced several million dollars to the
respective shipbuilders, has the department found it necessary to
advance even half of thirty per cent.

354

Our Newest Navy: Its Cost

XIII
In the early autumn of 1917, an interesting development of
the “cost-plus” idea took place. The act of October 6, 1917, made
available a considerable sum of money for the construction of
additional vessels. It was decided that these vessels should be
built on a cost-plus-fixed-profit basis, with a bonus privilege. As
intimated in the earlier part of these remarks, where the recom
mendations of the interdepartmental conference were referred
to, a cost-plus-fixed-profit arrangement, supported by a bonusor-penalty clause, is the best of the possible forms of cost-plus
contracts.
In regard to cost-plus-ten-per-cent.-profit contracts, there was
once current a rather harsh saying: “The more the contractor
spends, the more he gets.” Owing to competent cost-inspection,
this saying has never been meant to refer to navy work, but has
been applied in other directions only. It means, however, that
the higher the value of the contractor’s costs, the greater the sum
of money paid to him as profit, since, by the contractual terms,
he must be paid as profit ten per cent. of his costs. In the cost
plus-fixed-profit contracts, quite a different result ensues. The
more the shipbuilder spends, the less profit he gets. This happy
condition arises from the bonus privilege referred to.
A concrete example, based on the existing form of cost-plusfixed-profit contract, will make this point clear. The navy depart
ment and the shipbuilder agree upon the estimated cost of a
vessel—say $1,200,000. Upon this, the navy department agrees
to pay the shipbuilder a fixed profit—say $120,000. If, however,
it is found, upon completion of the contract, that the vessel has
actually cost only $1,000,000, then the shipbuilder receives onehalf of the “savings,” in addition to his fixed profit. In this ex
ample, then, the “saving” below the estimated cost—that is, the
difference between $1,200,000, and $1,000,000—being $200,000,
the shipbuilder receives one-half of the $200,000, or $100,000,
this being in addition to his fixed profit of $120,000. Hence, his
total profit on the vessel will be $220,000. It will be seen that,
by this kind of contract, the shipbuilder is keenly stimulated to
economy in production, quite unlike the cost-plus-ten-per-cent.profit contracts. Thus, the cost-plus-fixed-profit-with-bonus con
tracts may be expressed in a formula: “the less the shipbuilder
spends, the more he gets.”
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Of course, it would be a still more economical arrangement if
a penalty feature were embodied in the present contracts, that is,
if the vessel exceeded the estimated costs, the shipbuilder’s profits
should be cut down by one-half the overrun. This would be a
move toward an ideal contract. However, the country does not
yet seem to have achieved a state of mind to make this ideal
form feasible.
It is a clear indication of the great progress in mutual under
standing made possible by the stress of war that, in the relatively
short period from April, 1917, to October, 1917, the shipbuilders
were willing to shift from the original all-inclusive cost-plus-tenper-cent.-profit contracts to the present vastly more economical
cost-plus-fixed-profit-with-bonus-for-savings contracts. They have
come to a fuller realization than ever before that they are just
as much a part of government as are those of us whose par
ticular duty it happens to be to administer the people’s affairs and
to see that the laws of the people are carried out. If business
men act for the government they act for themselves. If govern
ment is ruined by reckless expenditures, business men are ruined.
The consequences of defeat in this war would be as hideous to
business men as to government. The interests of one are the
interests of the other. They cannot be separated. They are the
same interests. I venture to think that the work of cost inspec
tion, almost as much as any other one thing arising out of this
war, has enabled the business world to acknowledge—let us hope
forever!—these inexorable truths.
XIV
The savings to the government effected by cost inspection have
been very great. Only the merest glance can be given to them
here. Amounts saved at the respective “old-line” shipyards, by
the correction of actual errors, run from $10,000 to $100,000 each
month. While the actual number of shipyards under the cog
nizance of the compensation board cannot be named here, yet
the fact may be accepted that the direct savings thus made already
aggregate several hundred thousand dollars.
The prevention of the accumulation of improper costs, made
possible by the rigorous scrutiny given the shipbuilders’ records
by the local cost inspection boards, has resulted in economies
almost incalculable.
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In addition to keeping down costs in the manner above indi
cated, the compensation board has been able to make savings of
great sums by negotiations conducted direct from its own office.
Lower prices for material than prices first offered have often been
secured on large items. In more than one case, as much as a
million dollars has been struck off from the price of a single
class of equipment.
Various decisions made by the navy department, after consid
eration of recommendations presented by the compensation board,
have attracted great attention throughout the country. Among
these may be mentioned a ruling that bonuses paid by the ship
builders to officials of their companies cannot be accepted as
charges against naval vessels. Of even wider application is the
ruling that no part of federal taxes—income taxes, excess profit
taxes, munitions taxes, corporation taxes—paid by the shipbuild
ers can be reimbursed to them by the navy. Such rulings as these
have saved the government very great sums of money and have
prevented inflations of a sort whose deteriorative influences on
our national economy might have been almost illimitable.
The time is not suitable for giving more details of the great
success of cost inspection. An account of notable results may be
permissible in the future. But that the navy department’s policy
has been amply justified in the securing of good-will on the part
of shipbuilders and on the part of their employees, to the end
that expeditious construction of vessels has been effected, let
the commanders of our constantly augmented fleets testify.
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